Contents

List of Tables and Figures vi
List of Abbreviations viii
Acknowledgements x
1 Introduction 1
2 Governing Education Policy in Europe 18
3 Theorising and Measuring Citizenship at Multiple Levels 42
4 Promoting Education for, and about, Europe – The European Dimension 64
5 The European Dimension to National Curricula 93
6 European Citizenship and Youth Attitudes 119
7 Schools, Socialisation and European Citizenship 143
8 Conclusions 169
Appendix A 185
Appendix B 191
Appendix C 195
Appendix D 198
Notes 208
Bibliography 214
Index 232
Introduction

In 2013 the European Union (EU) launched the European Year of Citizens to highlight the rights that are associated with EU citizenship and to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the promulgation of those rights in the Maastricht Treaty. The selection of this theme was inspired in part by a 2010 Eurobarometer survey, which had shown that EU citizens’ understanding of their rights was still low (Eurobarometer, 2010a). Turnout for the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections had also been disappointing, suggesting once again that EU citizens had little interest in exercising their rights, or at least their electoral ones. And while the Official Decision for this European Year does not mention it explicitly (European Parliament and the European Council, 2012), the EP and Council representatives that issued this decision cannot have been unaware of the ongoing economic and political crisis engulfing the EU, and are likely to have been concerned about the potential implications for citizen’s attitudes towards European integration.

That there was a need for a campaign of this nature typifies both the transformation that has been taking place in citizenship (particularly in Europe), and the challenges that any project of this nature faces. This campaign was, in fact, just the latest in a long line of efforts to promote and strengthen the notion of European citizenship. Similar efforts stretch back to 1949, and extend far beyond the legal status of EU citizenship that was created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (and came into force in 1993). Moreover, the conception of citizenship that is at the heart of this project is not just limited to rights (the focus of the European Year campaign), or, for that matter, to the EU. This project has also been seeking to promote certain behaviours, identities,
attitudes and values, and at various points it has been led by the Council of Europe rather than the EU.

Along the way, education has often been presented as being central to the process of fostering European citizenship, and this point was re-affirmed once again in the *Official Decision on the European Year of Citizens* (ibid: Art. 19). Yet it was also acknowledged that ‘the primary responsibility for raising citizens’ awareness of their rights as Union citizens rests with the Member States’ (ibid: Art. 25). Despite the deepening of European integration, education continues to be governed by subsidiarity, and member states retain control over the structure and content of their school systems. As a result, the European institutions have limited power over the very institutions that could help (at least among young people) to bolster not only awareness of EU rights, but also European identities and attitudes. What is more, education has historically been bound-up with nation-building projects, traditionally focusing more on creating and sustaining the legitimacy of the nation-state rather than the European project, and often having done so in a way that excludes and ferments opposition to their European neighbours. What happens, then, when these nation-states are responsible for teaching about European citizenship?

It is these tensions, and their implications, that are the central focus of this book. To undertake this endeavour empirically, this book will first examine how European citizenship has been conceptualised and promoted in the education policies that have emanated from European institutions. The book will then examine how member states have responded to these initiatives – that is, how have member states adapted their national curricula and textbooks to teach young people about European citizenship? Finally, the book will also consider whether European citizenship has had an impact on young people’s perceptions of citizenship, and the extent to which their attitudes can be explained by their schooling experiences in different member states.

This chapter will first set out the context for this examination, providing a brief introduction to European citizenship and the debates that it has spawned, and an overview of the changing role of the state in governing education policy.

**New institutions and new forms of citizenship in Europe**

The emergence of pan-European supranational institutions has had a profound and unprecedented effect on relationships between and within the states of Europe. Supranational institutions first emerged in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War as a means of pro-
moting peaceful relations between the fractious states of Europe. Two World Wars in quick succession had wrought economic, political and social devastation on the nation-states of Europe and undermined the feasibility (and for some, the desirability) of the nation-state. Supranational institutions for political and economic co-operation (at least among the West European states) were thus seen as an ideal means with which to strengthen nation-states at the same time as providing a forum with which to contain inter-state competition and tensions (as well as warding off the threat of Soviet encroachment) (see Dinan, 2004). It was in this context, then, that a range of pan-European institutions was established. Chief among these were the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community (EEC, now European Union), the former of which was established to support democracy and political co-operation between states, while the latter was initially (or at least overtly) intended to facilitate economic co-operation between the founding members (namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany and Italy).

Despite these seemingly limited parameters, the membership, role and significance of these European institutions developed significantly over the following sixty years. In short, these intergovernmental initiatives have engendered a political arena that now stretches from Ireland to the Urals and touches upon almost all facets of governance and policy-making. This is especially apparent in the EU, which is the most prominent and integrated of the European institutions, and from which a unique political entity has emerged, one that is no longer a purely intergovernmental system but is rather an emergent polity (Chryssochoou, 2002: 757–8), albeit one that still ‘hovers between politics and diplomacy, between states and markets, and between government and governance’ (Laffan, 1998: 236). As the powers and scope of the European Union have expanded, so too has its requirement for legitimacy and, ultimately, its need for a demos over which it can exercise authoritative decision-making. Over time, the EU has thus attempted to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’ (Adonnino, 1985) and to establish a citizenship regime with legal, affective and behavioural dimensions.

The status of European Union citizenship was formally established with the ratification of the Treaty on European Union in 1992, whereupon a unique set of rights were granted to its citizens. These included the right to:

- move and reside freely anywhere in the EU
- vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the state where he/she resides
be protected by the diplomatic authorities of any member state when travelling or residing in a non-member country (if the citizen’s own member state is not represented), and petition the European Parliament and apply to the Ombudsman.

As we shall see in Chapter 4, the concept of EU citizenship was novel, but these rights built on a legal framework that had been gradually evolving since the 1950s. For example, political rights were first established in 1979, when citizens of member states were granted the right to directly elect representatives to the European Parliament. It was around this time the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also began to establish a range of civil and social rights (albeit in a piecemeal and non-distributive fashion) that extended and strengthened the long-standing employment rights that it had secured (Wiener, 2003: 406). These legal measures were complemented by identity-building projects; that is, efforts to create common symbols, experiences and values around which citizens from all member states could unite and which could generate public attachment to and support for European integration. Such extensive efforts are often beyond the Council of Europe, which remains an intergovernmental organisation and in the shadow of the EU. Nonetheless, the CoE has also been concerned with fostering citizenship rights and European identity. The CoE has, for example, championed citizen’s rights through legal instruments such as the 1997 European Convention on Nationality and the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, the CoE has long-promoted democratic practices and European citizenship identity through educational and cultural policies (see Chapter 4).

Together, then, the European institutions have gradually established a supranational framework that provides citizens of their member states with opportunities for rights, political participation and identity. The advent of these phenomena, however, has prompted considerable debate and raised a number of theoretical and conceptual questions about the nature of citizenship. One of the key debates has centred on the question of how to characterise and categorise this ‘new’ type of citizenship. Some, for example, have argued that EU citizenship is merely a market citizenship, and perhaps even one that is rooted in ‘neoliberal precepts of the individualized “market citizen”’ (Hansen and Hajer, 2010: 11). Others, by contrast, have argued that the EU has moved beyond a market-based model of citizenship, although, as Shaw (2007: 357–8) points out, they are often less confident about stating what it has been replaced with. Despite this, some commentators have been happy to argue that European citizenship is best viewed as a post-
national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Bosniak, 2006; Joppke, 2010: 21–2), arguing, for example, that rights have been decoupled from nationality and national culture, and that they are now granted on the basis of residence and/or universal personhood. These claims have been contested by others, however, who point out that the postnational aspects of this citizenship regime are limited to a distinct and exclusive group, namely citizens of EU member states. As Benhabib (2002: 460) put it:

While throughout the EU a dissociation of cultural identity from the privileges of political citizenship can be observed for EU citizens, for third-country nationals the ties between identities and institutions, between national membership and democratic citizenship rights are reinforced.

Over the past decade since Benhabib (2002) made this point, the rights afforded to third-country nationals have increased in many European states, and some of the differences between EU migrants and third-country nationals have become more blurred; but despite these developments, migrants from EU member states and those from non-EU states still do not enjoy the same rights, and the rights that are bestowed on non-EU migrants are still largely determined by national governments and not by the EU (see Shaw, 2007 and Joppke, 2010).

This leads us to a second key debate that has emerged: What are the implications of European citizenship frameworks for national citizenship? Have EU citizenship and legal developments supplanted national frameworks? What ‘value added’ or new rights does European citizenship provide? In terms of citizenship status, it has been argued that the advent of EU citizenship has not removed the need for national rights, as Union citizenship is fragmented, adds few ‘new’ protections for citizens, and is merely a supplement to national rights frameworks (Hansen, 2009, Shore, 2004, Wiener, 1999 and 1998, O’Leary, 1998: 99). For example, European institutions do not allocate social rights to their citizens, which Hansen and Hajer (2010: 198–9) suggest is a key limitation. Bellamy (2008), Dell’Olio (2005: 61) and others have also pointed out that EU citizenship status is dependent on national citizenship, as it is only granted to those who are entitled to citizenship of a member state and member states retain the right to confer nationality and, by extension, citizenship rights and obligations. Dell’Olio even suggests that, far from undermining national citizenship, EU citizenship has reinforced the link.
between nationality and citizenship, at least in the area of immigration policy (2005: 146–8).

Yet while it appears that European citizenship rights are not comprehensive enough to replace national citizenship, recent developments in EU citizenship rights arena arguably contradict the assertion that EU citizenship is entirely derivative, and that it adds nothing substantively ‘new’, as Hansen (2009: 6) suggests. For one, EU institutions now grant certain rights directly to its citizens (such as the right to access EU documents and EU civil service posts, and the right to petition the EU Parliament and the European Commission directly). Second, over the past decade the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted an increasingly expansive position on citizens’ rights, leading Joppke (2010: 29) to conclude that the idea of national control over citizenship law is now just an illusion, as the ECJ can (and does) make pronouncements that supersede national law (see also Kostakopoulou, 2008). Various commentators suggest that the implications of this are not merely technical, but also substantive, as the EU is not only starting to dominate the governance of citizenship law, but it is also changing the way that we understand citizenship, and the benefits that flow from it. Joppke (2010: 23–4), for example, argues that EU citizenship is not only a ‘light’ version of citizenship, but it also contributes to creating a ‘Citizenship Light’ version at the national level, because recent ECJ rulings undermine the incentive for member states to provide social benefits to their own citizens, for fear they may have to extend these benefits to citizens from other EU member states (see also Bellamy, 2008 and Hansen and Hajer, 2010: 198–9).

Nonetheless, while the supranational rights framework may be expanding and growing stronger, there is still sufficient evidence to suggest that the scope and strength of European citizenship should not be overstated. For one, Shaw (2011: 10)² has pointed out that ‘the “static” European citizen, in contrast to the mobile transnational one, does not seem to derive many benefits from the institution of [EU] citizenship’. In 2009, for example, it was estimated that only 11.7 million EU citizens were living in another EU member state, less than 2.5 per cent of the total population of EU (c. 500 million) (European Commission, 2010a: 11). As a result it could be argued that, in practice, EU rights are largely only available to, and availed of by, the small proportion of EU citizens who move to other EU member states. Second, legislation does not always lead to implementation, and the European Commission has acknowledged that its citizens still face numerous and
sometimes considerable obstacles when trying to access or exercise their EU rights (see European Commission, 2010a and b).

Is there a European citizenship beyond rights?

The other dimensions of European citizenship-building projects have been similarly challenging and equally contested. In particular, the question of ‘European identity’ has been subject to much attention, both theoretical and empirical. In the process scholars have raised questions not only about the substantive content and foundations of a European identity (Delanty, 1995; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Guibernau, 2011), but also about its relationship with, and implications for, existing political identities (primarily focusing on national identities). Here again, there is much disagreement, not least because there are multiple ways of conceptualising and measuring identity (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). For some, European citizenship policies have ‘an exclusivist “ethno-cultural” dimension emphasizing the (Judeo-Christian) civilizational, cultural, and religious facets of a European identity’ (Hansen and Hajer, 2010: 14). For others, by contrast, European identity has been (or should be) stripped of its cultural and political dimensions, and be based on an apolitical, technocratic and rational version of identity. These versions of European identity are sometimes presented as alternative or binary options, but Katzenstein and Checkel (2009) point out that both of these versions of European identity may co-exist (along with others), as European identity and its formation is far ‘messier’, complex and varied than current identity theories and studies often suggest.

While the parameters and progress of European identity continues to be debated, its impact on national identities has produced a more clear-cut set of possibilities. For example, ethno-nationalist theories contend that identities will remain tied to the nation-state as supranational identity projects lack the requisite cultural and emotional bonds to bind citizens to the (supranational) community (Cederman, 2001: 142, 146–7). Others, meanwhile, have argued that nationalist discourses will instead react against European citizenship, and generate new forms of nationalism such as extreme xenophobia (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002). At the other end of the spectrum, pan-nationalists, by contrast, contend that European identity can act as a positive and unifying force. This strand of the field assumes that Europe has a ‘cultural’ core that can be ‘rediscovered’ and deployed to replace divisive national
identities with an inclusive, umbrella culture that unites rather than divides Europeans (Cederman, 2001: 145–6, 150). Critics have warned, however, that efforts in this vein are often premised on a modified form of nationalism and thus replicate the exclusionary nature of citizenship status and identity (Delanty, 1995: 123). From this perspective, then, even if national citizenship identities were superseded, it could well be replaced with a similarly problematic ideology.

Postnationalism suggests a similar transformation will occur in national identities, but for different reasons; namely that it will be possible to decouple political and cultural identities (Cederman, 2001: 146, 148–9). As noted above, political identities are therefore to be based on universal, civic principles such as human rights and democracy, which in turn allows for political identities to shift from the national level to the supranational level, while cultural identities can remain particularistic or national. Citizenship rights and status are also organised at the national level, but stem from universal personhood and/or residence rather than membership of a national, cultural or ethnic community, and these rights are protected by national and international rights regimes (see Soysal, 1994; Habermas, 1992 and 1994). From a bounded integration perspective, however, the link between the nation-state and citizenship identities is too strong to erode, and thus its supercession by European forms of citizenship is doubtful (Cederman, 2001: 146, 150–2). Instead, the nation-state will merely continue to adapt its policies and mechanisms of identity-formation to ensure their survival.

This is not to say that the persistence of national attachments has entirely precluded the development of additional (supranational or other) attachments. Over the past decade or so there has been increasing recognition that identities can be ‘nested’ (national and European) rather than exclusive or binary (national or European) (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 10). Nor indeed should it be assumed that national attachments remain unchanged by European integration. In a cross-national study of subjective attachments among ‘ordinary people’ to political institutions in Europe (national and supranational), Robyn (2005) found little evidence of exclusive attachments to supranationalism or ‘traditional’ nationalism. Instead the survey suggested that individuals tend to adopt a pluralist position and multiple identities that encompass both supranationalist and nationalist attachments (albeit to varying degrees), and that how these attachments are expressed varies across European countries. The Italian survey, for instance, included what could be considered ‘vague anti-nationalists’, nationalists,
‘European Italianists’ and ‘United States of Europe’ supporters; while the French case revealed supranationalists, nationalists, optimistic pluralists and disaffected populists.

The notion of multiple, co-existing European identities rather than a singular, coherent and collective European identity is re-affirmed by Katzenstein and Checkel (2009: 216), but they also point out that European identity still holds little mass appeal (ibid: 214). This is borne out by survey data about EU citizens’ sense of European identity, which indicates that there is little evidence that citizens’ sense of allegiance and belonging to the state is transferring entirely or primarily to the European-level (Bellamy, 2008: 602). For example, the Eurobarometer survey conducted in Spring 2010 showed that only 7 per cent of respondents identified themselves as ‘Europeans’, and ‘87% of Europeans opted for an identity where their nationality comes before being European’ (Eurobarometer, 2010b: 113). These results remind us that national identity remains a potent source of attachment, and that European identity is far from supplanting it. Nonetheless, the fact that 41 per cent of respondents identified themselves as a national and a European indicates that some change has taken place, and that for a large proportion of Europeans, national identity is no longer the only identity being claimed.

The limits of Europeanisation are also apparent in research on EU citizens’ electoral participation and civic engagement. Participation (electoral or civic) continues to be predominantly defined by the national arena and there is little evidence to suggest that a pan-European political culture or public sphere has emerged. For example, there are as yet no pan-European political parties or electoral campaigns, and media remain largely tied to individual national public spheres (Kaelble, 2009). Even elections for the European Parliament tend to be won on the basis of national rather than European issues, although there is some evidence to suggest this is changing (De Vries et al, 2011; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). One could also point to the decreasing rates of voter participation in European Parliament elections. Participation rates vary widely across the member states (ranging from over 90 per cent of Belgian voters (where voting is compulsory) to just under 28 per cent of Czech voters), but the overall average participation rate in the 2009 EP elections across the EU was 43 per cent. This was a small decrease from the turnout rate in the 2004 elections (45.6 per cent), but is further evidence of the marked decline in turnout since the first direct elections in 1979, in which almost 62 per cent of EU citizens voted.4
One of the reasons for this low turnout is said to be citizens’ lack of information about European candidates and political issues, but also about their EU rights (European Commission, 2010b: 17–20). Knowledge among the general public about European institutions, policies and citizenship has consistently been low. For example, a Eurobarometer survey in 2010 indicated that a large majority (79 per cent) of the respondents were aware that EU citizenship existed, but far fewer claimed to understand what it meant (43 per cent) and even fewer still felt that they were well informed or very well informed about their EU rights (33 per cent) (Eurobarometer, 2010a). As we shall see in the next section, national governments have traditionally sought to address these sorts of issues by reforming school and curricula policy, as part of its wider efforts to inculcate citizenship through schooling. However, any efforts by European institutions to do something similar face two challenges. First, the European institutions are unable to effect these changes directly, as this policy area is governed by subsidiarity and decisions about school curricula and content continue to be controlled by member states. European institutions are therefore reliant on member states to decide how, what and when young people are taught about Europe and European citizenship. Second, as we shall see in the next section, schools are not a neutral site of learning, and the education of citizens has long been bound-up (perhaps inextricably) with state- and nation-building projects that are still ongoing. This long-standing relationship thus raises questions about how nation-states will respond to the emergence of a European citizenship and the suggestion that they educate their citizens not just for a nation-building project but also for a European political project.

Education, citizenship and the state in Europe

Education has long played a central role in the formation of states and citizens. With the rise of the modern nation-state in the 18th and 19th centuries, education came to be deeply embedded in the nation-building projects of the era. The consolidation of the nation-state during this period was predicated on the creation of common bonds among the chosen populace, and (to a greater or lesser degree) it was frequently assumed that these bonds must be ethno-cultural. However, in practice, most states were comprised of multiple ethnic and socio-cultural groups rather than a single, unified ‘nation’. The desired (or assumed) ethno-cultural homogeneity was thus not a given, but instead had to be created. A shared language, history and symbols were
central to this endeavour, and schools provided an ideal medium through which to introduce these shared features to future generations, as well as providing students with the information, literacy and skills required for political and economic participation (see Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1987; Green, 1997; and Heater, 2004b). Green (1997: 134) summarises these early efforts succinctly:

Through national education systems states fashioned disciplined workers and loyal recruits, created and celebrated national literatures, popularized national histories and myths of origin, disseminated national laws, customs and social mores, and generally explained the ways of the state to the people and the duties of the people to the state... National education was a massive engine of integration, assimilating the local to the national and the particular to the general. In short, it created, or tried to create, the civic identity and national consciousness which would bind each to the state and reconcile each to the other, making actual citizens out of those who were deemed such in law by virtue of their birth or voluntary adoption.

To achieve this, nation-states have used a variety of policy levers, such as founding and funding primary and secondary schools; imposing a standardised curriculum; and regulating the qualifications systems and the teaching profession. Over time, tools such as these allowed nation-states to gradually assert themselves as a dominant actor in determining citizens’ access to school and what they were taught while there. Over the past decade or so, however, it has been suggested that this hegemony is being threatened by the emergence of new international actors and by recent changes in the international political, economic and educational arenas. Education is increasingly subject to global and regional forces, both directly and indirectly. Global economic and technological developments have, for example, transformed the type of skills and knowledge required in post-industrial economies and, by extension, promoted in schools and higher education (see Brown et al, 2001). In addition, and perhaps more tangibly, international comparative frameworks such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) have become important influences in policy debates at the national level (Grek, 2009; Martens et al, 2010). Within Europe, the evolving dynamics of educational governance are arguably even more intensive, and a European Educational Area has emerged at the supranational level, despite the initial reticence of member states (and
indeed which is still lingering in some quarters). Within the EU, for example, education policy discussions now span all levels of the education system and, certainly since 2000, encompass virtually all aspects of education and training, including language learning, ICT, maths and science, key competences, guidance policy, quality assurance, recognition of qualifications, teacher training, mobility, lifelong learning, and citizenship education. The Council of Europe, for its part, has also developed a range of educational policy priorities, which include human rights and intercultural education, history teaching, higher education, and teaching foreign languages. In addition, member states have also come together outside of the formal supranational institutions to create intergovernmental co-operation processes such as the Bologna Process for higher education (Garben, 2011).

Amidst this rapidly changing environment, educational researchers have started to examine what these changes mean not only for the policy choices that countries make, but also for the ways in which policy is made or governed (Martens et al, 2010; Lawn and Grek, 2012). Unravelling the role of international actors and trends is particularly challenging, as the mechanisms of influence in this globalised environment are not necessarily formal or overt, but instead often rely on norm-formation, agenda-setting, and other forms of informal, non-coercive power (see Chapter 2). Even within the EU, which has a more established political and institutional framework, education is still governed by subsidiarity, and member states continue to retain control over the structure and content of their school systems. With the exception of reforms that are required by the European Court of Justice, European education policies are therefore not binding, and their implementation and interpretation is determined by member states at the national level. Identifying how and why European policies can still influence national education systems, despite limited formal power, is thus one of the key questions of contemporary educational research, and a puzzle that this book also seeks to answer in part.

The emergence of these new supranational actors raises questions not only about the role of the nation-state in contemporary educational governance but also about the implications this has for the long-standing relationship between education, nation-state formation and national citizenship. However, the evolution of this relationship is related not just to the introduction of new governance arrangements; the relationship is further challenged by the content of some European policies, for not only has European integration created a new type of citizenship (discussed above), but the European institutions have also
long sought to influence the aims and content of national citizenship education policies. The various policy initiatives that have been attempted are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4 of this book, but in short, the Council of Europe first broached the subject of civics education in 1949 and conducted a range of projects on the subject throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, education for and about citizenship has been one of the EU’s educational objectives since the 1970s, when the notion of a ‘European dimension to education’ was introduced to promote public understanding, interest and positive attitudes towards the European project (European Commission, 1974 and Karlsen, 2002). Since these early efforts, both institutions have maintained a keen interest in this subject. In 1997, the Council of Europe revived its efforts in this area with an exploratory project entitled *Education for Democratic Citizenship* (EDC). Over fifteen years on, this project has developed into a multi-strand programme that not only encompasses education for democratic citizenship but also education for human rights, and that targets not only policy-makers but also teachers and activists. Within the EU, recent policy initiatives have focused in particular on defining the relationship between education and citizenship (CoM of Education, 2004), the core competences of civic education (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006), and the measurement and indicators of active citizenship and civic competence (Hoskins, 2009; Hoskins and Mascherini, 2009). Supporting active citizenship has also become a transversal theme that is to be promoted throughout EU policies and programmes and throughout the educational life-course (European Commission, 2002).

In tandem with the emerging research on educational governance, researchers have also started to explore the implications of these citizenship education policies through textbook analyses, policy reviews, case studies and analyses of youth identities (see, for example, Keating et al, 2009; Schissler and Soysal, 2005; Faas, 2010; Eurydice, 2012). However, our understanding of these policy changes remains partial. Much of the research in this area has thus far relied largely on macro-level qualitative analyses, small-n case studies, and/or micro-level analyses or descriptive statistics from a small number of classrooms or countries. The connections between the macro, meso and micro levels have rarely been explored empirically in educational settings, and even less frequently using comparative quantitative data from schools and students. This book therefore tries to bridge this gap with an analysis that is both multi-level (European, national and individual) and
multi-method (qualitative and quantitative; historical and contemporary; textual and interview-based). In the process, the analysis will also draw on theories and findings from European studies, political science, citizenship studies and the sociology of education, trying to bring together the different lenses that these fields can bring and deepen our understanding of the ways in which the nexus between citizenship, education and states is changing in the context of European integration.

Structure of this book

The core questions at the heart of this book are: What is European citizenship and how have European institutions sought to transmit this idea through education? How have nation-states responded to these efforts? And what impact has European citizenship had on young people’s citizenship attitudes and to what extent have these been influenced by their schooling experiences in different member states? To help frame the subsequent empirical analysis, the opening chapters first provide an introduction to the key concepts and theories being examined here. To that end, Chapter 2 focuses on the governance relationship between the European institutions and national education systems. This includes a brief history of European co-operation in education, but focuses primarily on identifying the various governance tools through which European policies and political discourses are thought to influence policies and practices in member states. This chapter draws largely on secondary literature from educational studies, European Studies and policy sociology, but these sources are occasionally supplemented by data from European policy-makers who were interviewed at the early stages of this study. Combined, these sources allow us to see how the complex governance relationship between the European and the national arenas is being conceptualised in contemporary research studies, and to highlight some of the tensions and possibilities of Europeanisation and education in general.

Chapter 3 then examines how citizenship and citizenship education have been theorised, both historically and in response to the shifting European (and globalising) context. This review highlights that citizenship is a complex phenomenon that can be hard to pin down – conceptually, analytically and empirically. Along the way, therefore, this chapter considers not only how citizenship has been theorised in national and European governance spaces, but also how it has been measured in empirical studies of the relationship between citizenship,
education, individuals and societies. As a result of this review, the subsequent empirical chapters adopt a multi-faceted, multi-level and multi-variate approach to try to fully understand how citizenship is constructed, transmitted and practiced through education at different levels.

This empirical analysis starts in Chapter 4 with an in-depth exploration of ways in which citizenship discourses in the European education arena have evolved over time. The analysis is based on qualitative thematic analysis of policy-related documents that emanated from the European Union and the Council of Europe between 1949 and 2010. Using this comparative historical approach, this chapter argues that there have been three different phases of citizenship education policymaking at the European level, and that the citizenship discourses that underpin these policies have shifted from a national to a predominantly postnational model of (European) citizenship education. However, this analysis also underlines that the concept of European citizenship is often a shifting coalition of competing conceptualisations rather than a static or consistent narrative. As we shall see, the malleability of this concept has considerable disadvantages, but it may also partly explain its acceptance by, and co-existence with, national citizenships.

In Chapter 5, attention shifts to the national arena and to examining the way(s) in which member states’ education policies are currently responding to European integration and its associated citizenship-building efforts. Early efforts by European institutions to encourage education about Europe in schools were largely ignored by member states, but recent data shows that this is no longer the case, and that almost all European countries (and all EU member states) now teach their young people about Europe and European institutions. Yet we shall also see that there continues to be considerable variation in the ways in which young people learn about Europe, and in how education about Europe and European citizenship are interpreted by member states. To illustrate this, this chapter provides an in-depth textual analysis of citizenship education textbooks and policy-related materials from the Republic of Ireland. This close textual analysis highlights the ways in which member states can re-frame the concept of European citizenship for their own ends and suggests that while member states have accommodated these supranational discourses in their national curricula, they have partly done so in order to reinforce the nation-state and its national discourses of citizenship. Some of the reasons for this re-framing may be ideological or discursive, but the final section of
the chapter suggests that it can also partly be explained by the way in which education policy-making is governed in this emerging European education space. Using a case study of curriculum reform from Ireland, this section will highlight that weak institutional structures have limited the impact of European citizenship education initiatives in this case, but at the same time this ‘governance-light’ approach has made its efforts more adaptable and acceptable to national policy-makers. This argument is illustrated using interviews with policy-makers who oversaw the content of the new citizenship education curriculum in Ireland.

In Chapters 6 and 7, the analysis then shifts to the individual level. First, Chapter 6 examines young Europeans’ attitudes towards European citizenship and their knowledge of the EU. To do so, this chapter presents descriptive data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) and its European Regional Module (ERM). This large-scale comparative study gathered cross-national survey data on citizenship attitudes, behaviours and knowledge among students aged 14 (see Schulz et al, 2010; Schulz et al, 2011), including multiple indicators of young people’s attitudes towards European citizenship, from voting in EP elections, to belonging to Europe and/or the EU. On this theme, these data ultimately provide a rather mixed picture. On the one hand, there appears to be a high level of acceptance of (and even attachment to) the idea of Europe and its institutions. Yet at the same time young Europeans are not necessarily active, engaged or informed. Beyond the basics, knowledge about the EU and its institutions was modest, and the majority of students appear to be unaware of key facts that would help them to exercise their rights. Student support for European integration was qualified, and students expressed concern about the economic, cultural and demographic implications of European integration. Finally, young citizens reported only modest levels of interest and engagement in European politics (electoral or otherwise), and the national arena has, on average, remained the primary site of civic identification and engagement.

The ongoing primacy of young citizens’ ties to the nation-state is not surprising, not least because previous chapters have argued that the nation-state retains control over the governance and content of school curricula and, by extension, education about European citizenship. In light of this, Chapter 7 goes on to examine what impact (if any) this has on young people’s attitudes towards European citizenship and the extent to which it may explain the patterns that are described in
Chapter 6. In seeking to explore the role of school in European citizenship-formation, the chapter will focus in particular on three key areas through which previous literature has suggested that education and schooling might influence young people’s attitudes towards citizenship: first, through the level of opportunities provided by schools for young people to learn about Europe; second, through the type of citizenship encoded in state education policies; and finally, through features of the school culture, and in particular, peer attitudes towards European integration, immigrants and the nation-state itself. Drawing on multi-level modelling of the 2009 ICCS data, this chapter will argue that each of these aspects of schooling can play a role in shaping young people’s attitudes towards European citizenship, but that the effects are often small.

In the final chapter of this book (Chapter 8), I draw together the findings from each level of analysis – European, national and student level – to both synthesise the key findings and to consider the implications of these findings for citizenship, democracy, and the future of the state and European integration.
Index

Adonnino Report, 3, 23, 72–73, 75
Affective theories, 62, 146–147, 196
Bologna Process, 12, 25, 32
Charter for EDC and HRE, 37, 87, 92
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 80, 81, 83, 136, 211
Citizenship
  in the curriculum, 56–60
  definitions of, 42–44
  European citizenship, 56–63
  individual attitudes, 60–63
  relationship to education, 51–54, 62–63
  theories of, 42–51
Civic republican, 47, 85, 91, 172, 209
Cognitive engagement, 62, 145, 147, 195
  educational model, 54–55
  theory of citizenship, 47–48
  cosmopolitan resources, 145, 163–164, 178, 196
  educational model, 54–55
  theory of citizenship, 48–51
see also postnationalism
Education for Democratic Citizenship Project (EDC) Project, 13, 31, 37, 83–92
Erasmus, 22, 29
European Commission, 20, 24–29, 36, 74–78, 81, 84, 89–90, 129, 141
see also European Union
European Court of Justice, 4, 6, 12, 22, 28, 73, 80, 136
European Parliament, 1, 4, 9, 22, 73, 120–121, 129–132, 196
European Regional Module (ERM), 71, 95, 151–155, 191–197
European Union
  citizenship rights and status, 3–7, 66, 80–81
  Education policies, 21, 24–25, 72–79, 84–92
  governance of education, 19–28
see also Knowledge about the EU
European values, 61, 77, 83, 87–89, 136–189, 152, 159, 176
Financial instruments, 22, 28–29, 38, 108
Framing mechanisms, 35–36, 114
Freedom of movement, 136, 138–139, 140–141, 159, 162, 163, 165, 166, 182, 192, 204–205
Governance, of European education policy, 12, 18–41
Green Paper on the European dimension (1993), 24, 84, 89
Human rights, 4, 24, 31, 37, 65, 87, 100, 102–103, 163, 171, 178
International Civics and Citizenship Study (ICCS), 33, 51–53, 61, 120, 151–155, 183, 184, 191–197
Ireland, 27, 94, 99–116
  policymaking, 106–116
  Syllabi and textbooks, 99–106
Janne Report (1973), 74, 77, 208

Knowledge
about the EU, 10, 60, 76, 126–129, 143
measures of, 60, 126, 152, 160, 185–191
role in citizenship formation, 55, 59, 90, 145, 160–161, 164, 179

Liberal
educational model, 54–55
theory of citizenship, 45–47

Lisbon Process, 25–27, 33, 34, 84, 90, 208

Maastricht Treaty, 1, 23, 24, 79–80

Media, 9, 52, 62, 97, 98, 123–125, 145, 146, 183, 192


National model of civic education, 56, 59, 70, 99, 171, 172, 180

Open method of Coordination, 26–27

Participation, 120–122
Peer attitudes, 51, 125, 149, 150–151, 154, 164–166
Policy diffusion
theories and mechanisms of, 28–41
Policy entrepreneurship, 30–31, 35
Policy learning, 21, 34–35, 37, 109–110
Political discussion, 123–126
Political interest, 122–126, 145, 195
Political mobilisation, 62, 146, 196
educational model, 54–56
theories of, 49–51

Socialisation, 34–35, 62, 109, 147–149

Trust, 34, 129–132, 146, 154, 164–165, 183, 196

Voting, 9–10, 60–61, 73, 78, 85, 120–122, 123, 128, 144, 145–146, 152, 159–161, 164–168, 179, 183